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ABSTRACT 
 
Investigations of major catastrophes in process industries have revealed that 
deficiency of good safety culture is one of the underlying causes of such disasters. Not 
only has safety culture been recognized as a root cause, but also it is increasingly 
accepted as an influential factor in a risk analysis and considered as a legal requirement. 
Most of current quantitative risk analyses (QRA) rely on technical factors but more and 
more effort is being made for the incorporation of human and organizational factors 
(HOFs). Especially, safety culture largely represents an organizational attitude towards 
safety. Thus, how to measure safety culture in more effective manners and how to utilize 
such assessment data in a QRA are chosen as major objectives of this research. For the 
measurement of safety culture, this study suggests an approach that assesses values and 
assumptions by looking through artifacts, e.g., management level and employee’s 
behavior. Such approach employs following two methods: a matrix structure composed 
of safety culture dimensions, and grading schemes that provide different levels of safety 
practices. Using such an approach and suggested methods, a safety culture assessment 
questionnaire is developed as a results. For the incorporation of such safety culture data 
into a risk analysis, this study employs a risk model based on Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) 
and a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) to represent cause and effect relationships among 
variables. Mock-up safety culture data is generated for this analysis. Findings from 
investigation of Universal Form Clamp incident (2006) are used to establish a case 
scenario upon which a fault tree and an event tree are constructed. To make a transition 
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from qualitative knowledge about safety culture to quantitative probability data, some of 
the safety culture dimensions are selected as Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs), while 
Safety Culture Influencing Factors (SCIFs) are developed and introduced in this work. 
Using the established BBN, prior generic probability data are updated with newly 
obtained evidences such as mock-up safety culture assessment data. In addition, several 
analyses, e.g., predictive and diagnostic reasoning are conducted to determine how a 
change in safety culture affects the probabilities of safety-related events and also to 
identify which safety culture aspects need improvement.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Safety culture becomes a frequently used term in many areas of loss prevention 
and risk management practices such as in incident investigations, trainings and behavior-
based safety programs. Often times, people take advantage of mentioning safety culture 
as a catch-all term to describe organizational issues that are not easily delineated by the 
failure of equipment. Due to relentless efforts of social scientists, psychologists and 
engineering researchers, knowledge about safety culture has been accumulated enough 
to provide usefulness in several areas. Therefore, safety culture is widely utilized for the 
improvement of safety management systems of various organizations. For example, 
Shell launched Hearts & Minds project to develop a generative safety culture in which 
employees motivate themselves to behave safely [1]. Other examples of taking benefits 
of safety culture studies are found in the development of socio-technical risk analysis, 
e.g., SoTeRiA [2] and in the legislation of safety culture assessment regulations [3].  
Among realms of studies associated with safety culture, its definition and 
measurement have long been an academic research topic. The progress in this topic 
seems to start from a common tenet trusted and often quoted by management thinker, 
e.g., Peter Drucker that you cannot manage what you cannot measure [4]. So far, several 
philosophies and forms of safety culture measurement have been developed. However, 
attempts to view safety in an engineering perspective and to apply it to quantitative risk 
analysis (QRA) are still necessary to make safety culture assessment a handy tool for 
engineers and managers, particularly who are working in process industries. 
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1.1 Background 
Investigations of major industrial catastrophes along the history have revealed 
that deficiency of good safety culture is one of the underlying causes of such disasters. 
To begin with, the term, safety culture, made its first appearance after Chernobyl 
Nuclear incident took place in 1986. According to the incident investigation report [5] 
published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), poor safety culture in 
that nuclear power plant was one of the contributing factors to the incident. Since its 
advent, the term and concept of safety culture have begun to be widely accepted by 
others such as chemical & petroleum processing and aerospace industries. For instance, 
Texas City refinery explosion in 2005 exemplifies how lack of safety culture across its 
U.S. refineries can override its safety management system and align all the ‘Swiss 
Cheese’ holes [6] of safety barriers in a straight line. Examples of those incidents 
resulting from cultural factors are listed in Table 1.  
 
 
 
Table 1. A List of Incidents Resulting from Cultural Factors 
Industry 
Name of 
Incident 
Year Issues regarding Safety Culture 
Oil & gas 
La Porte 
Mercaptan 
Release 
2014 
Despite the DuPont’s reputation about its world-
class safety culture, multiple incidents at the 
facility indicated collapsed safety programs [7]. 
Macondo 
Well 
Explosion 
and Fire 
2010 
Flaws in offshore safety regulation, e.g., SEMS, 
allowed those companies of less mature safety 
culture to fail in identifying major hazards [8]. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Table 1 Continued 
Industry 
Name of 
Incident 
Year Issues regarding Safety Culture 
Oil & gas 
Texas City 
Refinery 
Explosion 
2005 
Discrepancies among BP’s five U.S. refineries 
showed that there was no consistent effort for 
maintaining the corporate safety culture [9]. 
Piper Alpha 
Explosion 
and Fire 
1988 
The incident epitomized the aftermath of 
production-oriented corporate culture where 
plant’s shutdown meant huge production loss and 
associated cost [10]. 
Nuclear 
Fukushima 
Nuclear 
Incident 
2011 
The nuclear plant had notable deviations in 
implementing international practices regarding 
hazard evaluation, high consequence events 
management and safety culture [11].  
Chernobyl 
Nuclear 
Incident 
1986 
The Chernobyl disaster resulted largely from 
insufficient safety culture at not only national 
perspective but also locally [12]. 
Aerospace 
Columbia 
Incident 
2003 
Complacency and unsupported confidence have 
brought shortcomings in safety culture that 
hindered asking about and capturing potential risks 
of foam insulation [13]. 
Challenger 
Incident 
1986 
Aviation 
Valujet 
Airlines 
Flight 592 
1996 
Valujet’s fast economic success may have caused 
corporate culture with insufficient rigor for 
achieving high level of safety [14]. 
Continental 
Express 
Flight 2574 
1991 
The underlying causal factor seems to be the 
failure of management to maintain corporate 
culture which was supposed to encourage and 
enforce compliance with maintenance and quality 
assurance programs [15]. 
 
 
 
Not only safety culture has been recognized as a root cause of an incident, but 
also it is increasingly being accepted as one of the factors that are considered in a risk 
analysis. Most of conventional quantitative risk analyses (QRA) rely upon technical 
factors that typically address hardware elements, e.g., equipment, material and process, 
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of a system. However, more and more attention is paid to human and organizational 
factors (HOFs) since such technical failures are largely dependent upon human error and 
a prevailing organizational attitude that underlies towards safety, or safety culture.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Layers of Risks Factors 
 
 
 
In order to illustrate the relationship of these factors, I am proposing a notion 
called Layers of Risk Factors (LORF) as presented in Figure 1. In theory, societal factors, 
e.g., regulatory bodies and industry associations should be taken into account in a risk 
analysis. The present study, however, limits its focus on both technical and 
organizational factor to highlight how those two can be amalgamated in a risk analysis. 
The question that comes up next is how such integration is made possible. Eq. (1)[16] 
proposes an approach that qualitatively represents that safety culture can be embraced in 
the well-known risk function. This equation simply and intuitively explains the inverse 
relationship between safety culture and risk. However, considering the complexity 
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associated with calculation of risks, quantifying safety culture in engineering terms still 
remains onerous.  
 Risk =  
Consequence × Frequency
𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒
 Eq. (1) 
Much of effort for conducting research in safety culture and its application to risk 
management has been voluntary by professional organizations and academia [17, 18]. In 
addition, regulators are pondering process safety culture assessment as a legal 
requirement for oil and gas industries. For example, the State of California offered a 
proposal [3] for the revision of Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries, 
which includes a mandatory execution of Process Safety Culture Assessment (PSCA). 
According to the proposed Safety Order, an employer shall develop, implement and 
maintain PSCA program. The employer shall conduct PSCA every five years and they 
shall ensure that PSCA addresses hazards reporting and implementation of an incentive 
scheme to encourage reporting and prioritizing process safety during upset or emergency 
situation. The employer also shall develop a written report and implement the 
recommendations. Yet, it is quite uncertain what changes are made to the proposed 
Safety Order during a law-making process but it is believed that this study gives useful 
guidance to companies in preparation for a safety culture assessment tool in advance 
before such law becomes effective. 
To summarize, the role of safety culture is becoming crucial in process industries 
in that it is considered as a root cause of incidents, a risk factor and a requirement. In this 
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regard, examining methods of measuring safety culture and incorporating it into a risk 
analysis will provide a meaningful contribution to managing socio-technical risks in 
process industries. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In spite of increasing demand on research about safety culture as mentioned in 
the previous section, there exist rooms for improving safety culture assessment tools. In 
overall, three main gaps have been identified through the literature review. Firstly, there 
is lack of consensus among dimensions of safety culture/climate assessment [19]. There 
are a plethora of studies that provide a set of dimensions by which safety climate is 
assessed. Nevertheless, many of them cover simplified and partial aspects of safety 
climate [20, 21]. Besides, safety climate, as its name suggests, represents perceived 
status about safety in an organization whereas safety culture refers to deeply rooted 
attitude towards safety that members of the organization take for granted. Furthermore, 
few were developed for the assessment of process safety culture.  
Secondly, a question is raised in terms of grading scale. Most of safety climate 
measurement tools employ 5-point Likert scale. This scale asks a person how much 
he/she agrees with the statement by assigning a number at each answer, for example, one 
(1) being strongly disagree and five (5) being strongly agree. Because an individual’s 
answer is based upon his or her perception about safety, the answer is likely to be 
subjective and thus unstable depending on his or her past experience and particular 
memory that pertains to a specific topic being questioned.  
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Finally, it is observed that there is an increasing demand on the incorporation of 
human and organizational factors into quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The importance 
of a human-being’s role as a designer of the system, an operator of the facility and a 
respondent to an emergency is rapidly growing in the process industries as the 
complexity of those industries increases. As such, safety culture, which heavily affects 
human performance, begins to be considered as a crucial factor in QRA. The simple 
concept for this relation is previously introduced in Eq. (1). Basically, conventional 
QRA views risk as a product of consequence and frequency of a certain event. That 
equation intuitively includes safety culture as a denominator so its reciprocal is 
proportional to risk. However, this concept has yet been validated and therefore more 
research effort is required to pinpoint the exact quantitative correlation between risks 
and the level of safety culture. Nevertheless, it is propitious that some researchers have 
been conducting socio-technical risk assessment studies such as SoTeRiA (Socio-
Technical Risk Assessment) [2, 22] where technical, human and organizational factors 
are assessed altogether. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main goals of the present work are to develop a more structured method of 
measuring safety culture, and to demonstrate how the assessment results can be used in a 
quantitative risk analysis. In order to serve this purpose and appropriately address the 
gaps identified in the previous section, this research has the following objectives: 
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1) To propose a framework of how safety culture in process industries can be 
effectively measured. This framework aims at providing its users a more 
comprehensive understanding about the status of safety culture. 
2) To provide a set of questions to assess safety culture based on the proposed 
framework. Measurement of performance often takes advantages of pre-
determined sets of questions to ask. The questionnaire can serve different 
usages such as employee survey, one-on-one interview or a combination with 
safety systems audit.  
3) To perform a socio-technical quantitative risk analysis of a chemical process 
operation using case scenarios and a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN). The 
BBN enables to put organizational attributes and technical factors together 
for a risk analysis. Comparisons between BBN-based results and 
conventional risk analysis outcomes are provided. Also, predictive and 
diagnostic reasoning is performed from the baseline BBN model. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Safety Culture & Climate 
 
2.1.1 Definition of Safety Culture 
Safety culture is a subset of organizational culture [23]. Thus, safety culture 
should not be understood as a stand-alone concept or the only lens through which safety 
behavior of a group is viewed. The culture of an organization is defined as “a pattern of 
shared basic assumptions learned by a group [24].” Despite the covert nature of 
organizational culture, it expresses itself as observable things such as written documents, 
behaviors of its members, organizational structures, procedures and physical 
arrangement of equipment and facilities. Originally, Schein (1990) developed this 
concept by proposing three fundamental levels of organizational culture: artifacts, 
espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions [24]. Likewise, these layers of 
safety culture should be approached in different manners to understand how safety 
culture gets formed, fostered and improved, or deteriorated.  
It is found that safety culture is defined in various ways through literature review. 
The term of safety culture made its first emergence in the Chernobyl nuclear incident 
investigation report [5] published in 1986 by the International Nuclear Safety Group 
(INSAG), convened and guided by the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA). 
The IAEA, later in 1991, defined safety culture as the “assembly of characteristics and 
attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
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priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance 
[25]”. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) gives an even finer 
definition about nuclear safety culture: 
“Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a 
collective commitment by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing 
goals to ensure protection of people and the environment”. (US NRC, 2015) [26] 
US NRC seems to be successful in bringing together the layers of organizational 
culture by stating not only values but also behaviors, a type of artifacts. In addition, US 
NRC states who is held responsible for the commitment and what goals they attempt to 
achieve. The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) 
similarly defines safety culture as “the product of the individual and group values, 
attitudes, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and 
the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety programs [27]”. The 
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS), a corporate membership organization 
within AIChE (American Institute of Chemical Engineers), defines process safety 
culture in its publication [17] as “the combination of group values and behaviors that 
determine the manner in which process safety is managed.” But, CCPS also briefly 
voices it as “How we behave when no one is watching.” Various definitions of safety 
culture are chronologically enumerated in Table 2. 
. 
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Table 2. Definitions of Safety Culture 
Author (year) Definition of Safety Culture 
Cox & Cox (1991)[28] 
Safety culture reflects the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in 
relation to safety. 
INSAG (1991)[25] 
Assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals that establishes that, 
as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance. 
Pidgeon (1991)[29] 
The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned 
with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public 
to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
Ostrom et al. (1993)[30] 
The concept that the organization’s beliefs and attitudes, manifested in actions, policies, and 
procedures, affect its safety performance. 
Guldenmund (2000)[31] 
Those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on attitudes and behavior related 
to increasing or decreasing risk. 
Lee & Harrison (2000)[32] The values, attitudes, beliefs, risk-perceptions and behaviors as they relate to employee safety. 
Richter & Koch (2004)[33] 
The shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and safety ––
expressed partially, symbolically––which guide people’s actions towards risks, accidents and 
prevention. 
Fang et al. (2006)[34] A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs, and values that the organization owns in safety. 
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Table 2 Continued 
Author (year) Definition of Safety Culture 
CCPS (2007)[17] 
The combination of group values and behaviors that determine the manner in which process 
safety is managed. 
BSEE (2013)[35] 
The core values and behaviors of all members of an organization that reflect a commitment to 
conducting business in a safe and environmentally responsible manner. 
Mentzer et al. (2014)[36] 
An organization's shared attitudes, values, norms and beliefs about safety, including attitudes 
about danger, risk, and the proper conduct of hazardous operations. 
US NRC (2015)[26] 
Nuclear safety culture is the core values and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment 
by leaders and individuals to emphasize safety over competing goals to ensure protection of 
people and the environment. 
 13 
 
2.1.2 Safety Culture vs. Safety Climate 
Safety climate, largely welcomed and employed by psychologists, is a commonly 
used term to describe safety culture during a short period of time. Many of the literature 
distinctively differentiates safety culture from safety climate, however, those two terms, 
in many cases, are utilized interchangeably [37]. Safety climate is considered to be a 
manifestation of safety culture in the behavior and attitude of employees [37]. The term, 
safety climate, began to gain its popularity when Zohar (1980) published his research 
paper about theoretical and applied implications about safety climate in different 
industries in Israel [38]. Zohar, who developed and attempted the first measure of safety 
climate, conceptualized it as a subset of organization climate and he defined it as “molar 
perceptions” that members of an organization possess about the surrounding situation 
[38]. More and more researchers after him ventured to assess safety climate and tried to 
figure out how safety climate is manifested within an organization. The most widely 
accepted concept of safety climate is that it is the way how people perceive the safety 
culture of the organization they belong to. For example, the UK Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) defines it as the “tangible outputs or indicators” of corporate safety 
culture, which is accepted by individual members or a group of people at a certain period 
of  time [39]. Cooper (2000) classifies safety climate as one of constituent aspects of 
safety culture [40]. His classification of safety culture is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Since safety climate is concerned with the perception of individual members of 
the organization, it is likely to be unstable and changeable over times. The way that 
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safety climate is formed can be influenced by the policies and practices that those 
organizations put in place [41].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Three Aspects of Safety Culture (Cooper, 2000) 
 
 
 
It is a common belief that safety climate influences the occurrence of incidents at 
work and vice versa. Namely, safety climate can be a leading indicator, e.g., good safety 
climate that precedes low incident rate, but also it can be a lagging indicator, e.g., a 
series of incidents or fatality which, as a result, deteriorates safety climate [42]. In most 
cases, safety climate is determined by applying questionnaires about given safety 
focuses, i.e., the attitude and behavior of an employee’s supervisor. Bergman et al. 
(2014) further investigate the ‘shelf life’ of safety climate assessment. Their finding is 
that the validity of safety climate measurement expires only after a few months [43]. To 
sum this all up, safety climate is the foreground where things associated with safety 
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emerge above the surface while safety culture is regarded as the background which 
underlies at the bottom of the organization [18]. This relationship between safety culture 
and safety climate is often depicted through an analogy of an iceberg as illustrated in 
Figure 3 (the picture is taken from [44]). Safety climate is the part seen above the surface 
and corresponds to artifacts. This pertains to observed behaviors of the members, written 
documents such as policy statements, work procedures and signs/banners, and formal 
structure and system of an organization. On the contrary, safety culture is a tacit attribute 
of the organization. Safety culture is associated with intention and motivation of the 
behavior, value and belief upon which policies and procedures are established, and 
deeply rooted assumptions that members of the organization take for granted. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Iceberg of Safety Culture and Safety Climate (Picture from Riley, 2015) 
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Wiegmann et al. (2004) provide an integral view about both safety culture and 
safety climate through extensive literature review [45]. They suggest some 
commonalities that exist across the literature regarding safety culture and safety climate, 
respectively. The summary of such commonalities is made in Table 3. In addition to the 
iceberg analogy, this work shows more sophisticated and discernible characteristics of 
two terms in relation to members, organizational systems and responsiveness to change. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Commonality of Safety Culture/Climate Studies (Wiegmann et al., 2004) 
Safety Culture Safety Climate 
 A concept defined at a group level. 
 Shared values among all the group or 
organization members. 
 Concerned with formal safety issues. 
 Closely related to the management 
and supervisory systems. 
 Emphasize the contribution from 
everyone at every level. 
 Impact members’ behavior at work. 
 Reflected in the contingency between 
reward systems and safety 
performance. 
 Organization’s willingness to learn 
from errors and incidents. 
 Enduring, stable and resistant to 
change. 
 A psychological phenomenon defined 
at a particular time. 
 Concerned with intangible issues such 
as situational and environmental 
factors. 
 Temporary manifestation or snap shot 
of safety culture. 
 Unstable and subject to change. 
 
By the reticent nature of organizational culture, measuring directly safety culture 
of an organization is challenging, and also the relationship between safety culture and 
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the causation of industrial incidents has yet been clearly proven so far. Instead, a number 
of researchers employ safety climate as a yardstick to measure safety culture at a specific 
period of time. 
 
2.1.3 Safety Climate Survey Tools 
Based on the knowledge that safety climate is employees’ perception about 
safety, safety climate is commonly assessed through employee surveys [42]. Zohar 
(1980) made the first attempt to measure safety climate by making use of a questionnaire 
that he created. He developed 40 items based on seven organizational dimensions. Since 
then, many other advocates of safety climate began to design safety climate 
questionnaires and put them into use. A summary of some of those safety climate studies 
is presented in Table 4.  
Since a questionnaire is the most common medium adopted for safety climate 
assessment [46], there are several things to consider in designing and conducting the 
survey. For instance, the design of such questionnaire for assessment should take into 
consideration the length of questions and the number of people surveyed. Other 
instruments such as interview and audit are utilized from time to time in cases where 
more thorough assessment is required. However, using interview and/or audit for safety 
climate assessment is a lengthy process and also requires a group of experts 
knowledgeable in overall safety management systems and safety culture. Once the type 
of instrument has been determined, the scope of assessment is discussed as to how many 
employees are involved in the survey and at which organizational level safety climate is 
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assessed. The number of people who are asked to do a survey depends upon statistical 
settings such as confidence levels. However, when it comes to organizational levels of 
the assessment, the approach is not straightforward and it is necessary to consider how 
people in different levels perceive things differently. With this regard, Guldenmund 
(2007) employed three levels of safety climate: organizational, group and individual 
[46]. He viewed that each level of an organization represents different safety climate. In 
other words, one measurement tool used for a certain level may not be directly 
applicable to another level of organization. However, this study does not attempt to 
provide separate approaches for such different levels. Whereas things mentioned above 
are related to the shape of an assessment, dimensions of the assessment deal with its 
content. If the former means how the survey is carried out, the latter indicates what is 
measured. As seen in the Table 4, some dimensions such as management commitment 
and communication are quite common among literatures but a majority of them differ 
from one another. In addition, most of safety climate instruments adopt 5-point Likert 
scale to measure the subject’s evaluation about a statement or a question. By assigning a 
different discrete value on each choice, Likert scale can take the semi-quantitative form. 
One of the significant differences of this research from 5-point scale is that this study 
does not employ 5-point scale or similar scale scheme. Rather, this study suggests a list 
of specific answers that represent different levels of company safety value. 
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Table 4. Summary of Safety Climate Assessment Tools 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
Gao et al. (2015)[47] Aviation 
/ Asia-Pacific 
region 
 Safety philosophy 
 Safety reporting 
 Safety feedback 
 Safety promotion & communication 
33 items 5-point 
Nielsen et al. (2013)[48] Petro-Maritime 
/ Norway 
 Safety prioritization 
 Safety management and involvement 
 Safety vs. production 
 Individual motivation 
 System comprehension 
35 items 5-point 
Sparer et al. (2013)[49] Construction 
/ US 
 Safety climate 
 Worker involvement 
 Management involvement 
9 items 100-
point 
Bosak et al. (2013)[50] Chemical 
/ South Africa 
 Management commitment to safety 
 Priority of safety on plant 
 Pressure for production 
26 items 5-point 
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Table 4 Continued 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
US NRC (2009)[51] Nuclear 
/ US 
 Clarity of responsibilities 
 Management leadership 
 Supervision 
 Working relationship 
 Empowerment 
 Communication 
 Workload and support 
 Training and development 
 Performance management 
 Job satisfaction 
 Engagement 
 NRC mission and strategic plan 
 NRC image 
 Organizational change 
 Continuous improvement commitment 
 Quality focus 
 Open, collaborative work environment 
145 items 100-
percent 
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Table 4 Continued 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
Vinodkumar & Bhasi 
(2009)[52] 
Chemical 
/ India 
 Management commitment and actions for safety 
 Workers’ knowledge and compliance to safety 
 Workers’ attitudes towards safety 
 Workers’ participation and commitment to 
safety 
 Safeness of work environment 
 Emergency preparedness in the organization 
 Priority for safety over production 
 Risk justification 
54 items 5-point 
Wu et al. (2009)[53] Petrochemical 
/Taiwan 
 Safety Leadership 
: Safety coaching, caring and controlling 
 Safety Climate 
: Employee commitment, risk perception and 
emergency response 
 Safety Performance 
: Safety inspection, accident investigation, 
training and safety motivation 
46 items 5-point 
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Table 4 Continued 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
Lin et al. (2008)[54] Multiple 
industries e.g., 
construction, 
refinery, cement 
production. 
/ China 
 Safety awareness and competency 
 Safety communication 
 Organizational environment 
 Management support 
 Risk judgment 
 Safety precautions 
 Safety training 
21 items 5-point 
Neal & Griffin (2006)[55] Healthcare 
/ Australia 
 Safety climate 
 Safety motivation 
 Safety compliance 
 Safety Participation 
12 items 5-point 
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Table 4 Continued 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
UK Health and Safety 
Executive (2002)[56] 
 
/ CST (Climate Survey 
Tool) 
General 
/ Worldwide 
 Organizational commitment and communication 
 Line management commitment 
 Supervisor’s role 
 Personal role 
 Work mates’ influence 
 Competence 
 Risk taking behavior and some contributory 
influences 
 Obstacles to safe behavior 
 Permit-to-work system 
 Reporting of accidents and near misses 
71 items 5-point 
Robert Gordon University 
& Aberdeen University 
(1998)[57] 
 
/ OSCQ (Offshore Safety 
Climate Questionnaire) 
Offshore 
/ Worldwide 
 Job 
 Risk perception – main/work task hazards 
 Assessment of safety 
 Safety attitude 
 Contractor safety attitude 
 Job security 
 Accident history 
153 items 5-point 
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Table 4 Continued 
Researcher(s) 
/ Name 
Industry 
/ Country 
Dimensions (factors) 
Number of 
Items 
Scale 
Donald & Canter 
(1994)[58] 
 
/ SAQ (Safety Attitude 
Questionnaire) 
Chemical 
/ UK 
 People 
: Self, workmates, supervisor, manager and 
safety representative 
 Attitude behavior 
: Knowledge, satisfaction and execution 
 Activity 
: Passive/active 
167 items 5-point 
Zohar (1980)[38] Multiple 
industries e.g., 
metal 
fabrication, food 
processing, 
chemical, etc. 
 Perceived importance of safety training 
programs 
 Perceived management attitudes toward safety 
 Perceived effects of safe conduct on promotion 
 Perceived level of risk at work place 
 Perceived effects of required work pace on 
safety 
 Perceived status of safety officer 
 Perceived effects of safe conduct on social status 
 Perceived status of safety committee 
40 items 5-point 
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2.1.4 Characteristics of Good Safety Culture 
Knowing what characterizes good safety culture is crucial because it gives better 
idea of how to select dimensions of safety culture assessment. Several authors proposed 
a group of traits of a company with good safety culture. Mannan et al. (2013) presented 
ten characteristics of best-in-class safety culture [59]. Those characteristics are compared 
with those of UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) [60] and Center for Chemical 
Process Safety (CCPS)’s Risk Based Process Safety (RBPS) [17] in Table 5. To make 
the comparison easier, elements of UK HSE and CCPS are re-ordered to fit Mannan et 
al.’s list. In spite of variations in wording, most of the elements are commonly 
addressed.  
A company with good safety culture is not only distinguished by its safety 
performance but also the health of the organization. Healthy safety culture is largely 
driven by strong leadership and unyielding management commitment to safety. How 
committed the top management is to safety often determines the success of safety 
initiatives and the allocation of resource that is required to achieve such initiatives. 
Effective safety leaders, who lead by example, influence other members in an 
organization in the way they accept the value of safety and behave in safe manners. 
When those leaders demonstrate their commitment to safety through appropriate actions 
and supports, other people start to follow such actions and consider safety as a core 
value. In addition, excellence of safety leadership is characterized by how successfully 
management creates safety mission and vision, and renders them embedded throughout 
the organization. Also, assigning clear roles and responsibilities for all levels in the 
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organizational structure is another key task that leaders should assume [61]. This guides 
each member to get specific knowledge of what to act for safety. 
Once management possesses strong commitment to safety, it cascades down 
through each level of the organization. Consequently, people begin to accept safety as a 
value, not a priority. A value is something that is not traded off when different priorities 
are competing each other. For instance, if more production can be compensated by less 
quality of a product, then those two play as a priority. 
On the contrary, when safety is recognized as a value, people do not compromise 
safety with any other priorities irrespective of the consequence of their decision. In the 
long run, they have a robust conviction that safety would bring the greater good such as 
the protection of human lives, enhancement of their health, and the pursuit of happiness. 
As safety culture is shared by members of a group, their participation, often enabled and 
facilitated by valiant empowerment from managers and supervisors, is of paramount 
importance. Employees’ activities at the grassroots in the organization make sure that 
safety initiatives are not only talked in the document but also walked in practice. Their 
involvement also ensures to catch weak signal that otherwise may snowball to a large 
process mishap such as loss of containment (LoC). 
In order to catalyze the interaction between management and employees, formal 
arrangements, for instance, communication channels at all levels of the organization 
should be made. Two-way and open communication including reporting incidents and 
sharing lessons learned are also common traits of an organization having mature safety 
culture. Such organization often accommodates high standards and exemplary practices 
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that go beyond compliance with given standards and regulations. In addition to these 
features, healthy safety culture is sustained by continuously and stringently monitoring 
safety performance and by elevating safety awareness of its members. This monitoring 
helps identify the current status of safety culture and provide feedback to its members 
and work processes of the organization. 
Since these properties of good safety culture are derived from lessons learned 
through history and best practices of organizations with excellent safety programs [59], 
those characteristics proposed in the literature represent just an ideal condition which is 
not easily captured in one organization, but they are worth being pursued in every 
organization. With that being said, the ideally expected features will be used to measure 
safety culture against. This study largely employs Mannan et al.’s work [59] but also 
attempts to take advantage of the guidelines presented in the CCPS RBPS [17], so such 
approach helps make the safety culture measurement more relevant to process industries.
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Table 5. A Comparison of Characteristics of Safety Culture 
No. UK HSE (2001) [60] Mannan et. al. (2013)[59] CCPS RBPS (2007)[17] 
1 
Management commitment and 
visibility 
Leadership Strong leadership 
2 Productivity versus safety Culture & value Process safety as a core value 
3 Shared perceptions about safety Goals, policies & initiative  
4  Organization and structure 
Documentation of process safety 
culture emphasis and approach 
5 Participation Employee engagement and behaviors 
Empowerment to individuals 
/ Defer to expertise 
6 Safety resources 
Resource allocation and performance 
management 
 
7  Systems, standards and processes High standards of performance 
8 Communication Metrics and reporting 
Open and effective communication 
/ Timely response to process safety 
issues and concerns 
9 Learning organization/ Training A continually learning organization A questioning/learning environment 
10  Verification and audit 
Continuous monitoring of 
performance 
11 Trust  Mutual trust 
12   A sense of vulnerability 
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2.2 Quantitative Risk Analysis 
As the complexity associated with hazardous operations in process industries 
increases, the quantification of risks is gaining more popularity to support decisions 
critical to the safe conduct of such operations. Quantitative Risk Analysis, as its name 
suggests, is a method that numerically calculates risks in terms of the frequency and the 
consequence of an event. Conventional or traditional QRA has long been considered 
technical aspects of a system [62]. However, the roles of human and organizational 
factors (HOFs) have become pivotal to ensure to maintain the overall system integrity of 
the facility. In order to include the HOFs into the QRA, the following analysis 
methodologies are employed.  
 
2.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Firstly introduced by H.A. Watson of Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1961, fault 
tree analysis represents the structure of a failure event by investigating its component as 
causes [63]. Being a deductive approach, FTA starts from the failure or abnormal event 
on the top of the tree and examines downward by identifying its parts or subsystems. 
Such examination continues until failing base elements are obtained and those elements 
are not able to be decomposed into any smaller entities [64]. Fault tree employs several 
logic gates to explain the relationship between input and output events. The functions 
and typical symbols of some common logic gates are presented in Table 6. Since fault 
tree analysis has the top event at its peak and constituent parts below, the overall 
structure appears to be a tree. Therefore, input events are placed lower than output ones 
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in the tree. A cut set in FTA is defined as a combination of component failures that lead 
to a system breakdown and it is called a minimal cut set when the system fails if and 
only if all of the components of the set fail [65]. 
 
 
 
Table 6. Common Logic Gates of a Fault Tree 
AND OR Exclusive OR Priority AND Inhibit 
     
Output occurs 
if all inputs 
occur. 
Output occurs 
if any of inputs 
occurs. 
Output occurs 
if only one 
input occurs. 
Output occurs 
if inputs occur 
in a certain 
sequence. 
Output occurs 
if input occurs 
under a 
specific 
condition. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
While a fault tree is devised to identify component failures that cause the top 
event to occur, an event tree begins with an initiating event, for instance, flammable 
liquid spill, and analyzes a sequence of actions and possible consequences based on the 
success or failure of such actions of barriers. Given the frequency of the initiating event, 
the event tree is able to generate the frequencies of each outcome by combining the 
probability of the barriers [66]. An example of the event tree of the liquid spill is taken 
from Lee’s Loss prevention in the process industries: Hazard identification, assessment 
and control [67] and illustrated in Figure 4. Based on this event tree, a flammable liquid 
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spill may lead to four different outcomes depending upon the types of situations 
following the spill. The numbers in the tree indicate conditional probabilities of such 
occurrences. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The Event Tree of Liquid Spill (Lee, 2012) 
 
 
 
2.2.3 Bow-tie Analysis 
In spite of aforementioned advantages, the fault tree analysis and the event tree 
analysis have limitations to some extent at which the overall risk scenarios cannot be 
described. Bow-tie (BT) analysis, which employs both a fault tree (FT) and an event tree 
(ET) at the same horizon, is very helpful to show the chain of events from causes of the 
fault tree to outcomes of the event tree. Having a fault tree rotated 90° clockwise on the 
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left side and an event tree on the right side, the overall structure looks like a bow-tie 
after which the name of the analysis was taken [64]. The interface between the FT and 
the ET is made by making the top event of the FT the initiating event of the ET. 
Therefore, BT becomes able to represent the structure of the overall risk scenarios, 
which consist of primary events, intermediate events, the top event, safety barriers and 
consequences [68]. The schematic diagram of the bow-tie is provided in Figure 5. Safety 
barriers on the left are generally called preventive controls since they play as prevention 
measures while those on the right are termed as protective controls as they serve 
mitigation purposes [64]. 
Figure 5. A Schematic Bow-tie Diagram 
2.2.4 Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) & Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) 
Basically, a risk model is a logical structure where relations among causes and 
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consequences of incidents are depicted. Among many of them, Hybrid Causal Logic 
(HCL) [69] is employed for the BBN application in the present study. HCL is similar to 
Bow-tie model in that it connects a fault tree (FT) and an event tree (ET) but different in 
that it can accommodate multiple layers of variables that lie under the basic event of the 
fault tree and the safety barriers of the event tree. The HCL is designed to include both 
hard elements, which is deterministic, and soft attributes such as organizational and 
regulatory factors [70]. Initially, HCL methodology was developed and utilized for 
aviation industry [71] but its power of receiving various types of variables enables the 
applications to expand to the risk assessment of different industries such as offshore 
sectors [72]. A typical risk model using HCL is presented in Figure 6. Basically, this 
model consists of fault tree, event tree and Bayesian network. Some of the nodes in the 
Bayesian network called as Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) [73] are connected to the 
basic events of fault trees to represent hidden causal factors underneath them. RIFs are 
defined as those factors that influence the level of risk of a system or an activity [73]. 
Employing RIFs in the risk model helps to identify and measure multiple dimensions 
that relate to managerial and organizational aspects. As a result, it becomes possible to 
draw a ‘big picture’ of the composite socio-technical risk profile. 
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Figure 6. Risk Modelling Using Hybrid Causal Logic (Røed et al., 2009) 
Two levels of RIFs are employed in this study and presented in Figure 7. Level 1 
and Level 2 RIFs are taken from Aven et al.’s BORA (Barrier and Operational Risk 
Analysis) [74] and Mannan et al.’s attributes of best-in-class safety culture [59], 
respectively. Since Level 1 RIFs are more superficial and formal elements that generally 
constitute safety management systems of an organization, they are placed above Level 2 
RIFs in the risk model and thus impacted by them. 
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Figure 7. Two Levels of Risk Influencing Factors 
2.3 Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
There is a growing number of attempts to include human and organizational 
factors into conventional risk analyses where technical factors are generally accounted 
for. Because of the qualitative nature of such non-technical factors, a Bayesian Belief 
Network (BBN) or Bayesian Network (BN) is often utilized to incorporate new 
knowledge from observations or evidences, which are not only numerical data of 
technical components but also underlying Risk Influencing Factors, for example, the 
influence of safety culture. 
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2.3.1 Definition of the Bayes’ Theorem 
Named after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, a minister and a mathematician [75], 
Bayes’ theorem, which provides mathematical grounds to a Bayesian Belief Network, is 
the statistical theorem that allows existing knowledge (A) to be updated from new 
observations or evidences (B) [64]. Because of the capability that factors in additional 
information, the Bayesian inference can be applied to medical and legal sectors, financial 
domains, safety and reliability analysis [76]. The basic Bayes’ theorem for this update is 
shown in Eq. (2).  
 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
 Eq. (2) 
In order to explain the updating process, an example of the relationship between 
smoking and having a heart attack is presented in Figure 8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. A Simple Bayesian Belief Network 
 
 
 
Two random variables or nodes are connected with an arc to represent the direction of 
the relationship. Let’s say that the prior probability of having heart attack, P(A) is 0.01, 
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and the probability of a person being a smoker is 0.3, P(B)=0.3. Based on this initial 
belief and observed evidence or likelihood about smokers among those having cancer, 
i.e., P(B|A)=0.7, the posterior probability of having cancer given the person is a smoker, 
P(A|B), can be calculated using Bayes’ theorem.  
 𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
=
0.7 ∗ 0.01
0.3
= 0.023  
The calculation above shows that the posterior probability of having cancer becomes 
more than doubled by using the new evidence about smokers.  
For discrete variables, Eq. (2) can be generalized into Eq. (3). 
 𝑃(𝐴𝑗|𝐵) =
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴𝑗) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴𝑗)
∑ 𝑃(𝐵|𝐴𝑖) ∗ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖)
𝑘
𝑖=1
 Eq. (3) 
where A and B1, ..., Bk are events in a sample space Ω. 
For continuous random variables X and Y, Bayes’ theorem is expressed in terms of 
probability density function (e.g., the pdf of a component) like shown in Eq. (4).  
 𝑃(λ|ε) =
𝐿(𝜀|𝜆)𝑓(𝜆)
∫ 𝐿(𝜀|𝜆)𝑓(𝜆)𝑑𝜆
∞
0
 Eq. (4) 
where 𝑓(𝜆) is the probability density function of a prior failure rate, λ, of a component 
and 𝐿(𝜀) is the likelihood function based on a newly obtained evidence, ε. And then, 
P(λ|ε) becomes the posterior pdf of λ given ε. Denominators, the total probability of the 
observed evidence, in both equations play as a normalizer that restricts the posterior 
probability between 0 and 1. 
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2.3.2 Definition of Bayesian Belief Network 
Based on the Bayes’ theorem, a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is a graphical 
model that represents random variables with a finite set of states and their conditional 
dependencies using a directed acyclic graph (DAG) and a set of node probability tables 
(NPTs). A BBN is a very powerful method for probabilistic reasoning [77]. The BBN 
provides a vehicle to perform numerical and traceable risk analyses and it makes 
possible to incorporate various types of data together. These data include, for example, 
equipment reliability data as well as soft data such as employee’s competence and 
organizational change. BBN-based software such as AgenaRisk provides the following 
advantages [76]: 
 Decision reasoning, e.g., diagnostic and predictive, under uncertainty can 
be done. 
 Actual and large-scale situations can be dealt with. 
 A wide variety of data, i.e., expert’s judgment and empirical data can be 
blended. 
Taking benefits of using BBN, several operational risk analyses that address 
those soft factors were conducted. Trucco et al. (2008) performed a BBN analysis for 
human and organizational factors (HOFs) using maritime guidelines and regulations 
[78]. The basic structure is built upon the Maritime Transportation System (MTS). The 
BBN modeling of HOFs is proven to be useful to figure out additional ways of reducing 
the risk at the organizational and regulatory perspectives [78]. Garcia-Herrero et al. 
(2013), on the other hand, demonstrate how to perform a BBN analysis for the 
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relationship between safety culture and organizational culture in the context of nuclear 
industry [79]. Their work examines how to analyze the influence from organizational 
culture to safety culture using the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI) [80]. They 
proposed as a result of research that the constructive style of organizational culture poses 
the strongest impact on the safety culture. An example of BBN modeling for process 
plants is also captured. Ale et al. (2014) develop a dynamic BBN model to represent 
risks with a real-time nature of a petroleum processing facility [81]. Not only are 
technical factors considered in that model, but also human factors and managerial 
actions are taken into account. The analyses show that management actions can play as a 
common cause failure [81]. 
Understanding the usefulness proven in the previous studies, this study attempts 
to demonstrate how evidences obtained from safety culture assessment can update the 
existing probabilities of events using a case scenario established upon a past chemical 
incident. 
 
2.3.3 Illustrative Example of Bayesian Belief Network 
Figure 9 shows a very simple Bayesian Belief Network based on the scenario 
originally provided by Poole and Neufeld [82] and the model is available in the 
AgenaRisk Version 6.2 [83]. The scenario describes a situation where a fire alarm goes 
off and, as a result, people leave the place and report to others. Basically, the fire alarm 
is activated by detecting fire but sometimes it is actuated by tampering. Six nodes are 
shown in this BBN to represent variables and their relationships are defined by the 
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existence and the direction of arcs. A parent node is the one from which the arc departs 
and a child node is the one to which the arc arrives. Conditional probabilities given the 
state of the parent node are specified in NPTs. Some examples of the NPTs used in this 
case are provided in Table 7 and Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The Prior Probabilities in a Fire Scenario (AgenaRisk 6.2) 
 
 
 
Table 7. The NPT for Smoke Node 
Fire True False 
Smoke 
True 0.9 0.01 
False 0.1 0.99 
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Table 8. The NPT for Alarm Node 
Tampering True False 
Fire True False True False 
Alarm 
True 0.5 0.85 0.99 0.0001 
False 0.5 0.15 0.01 0.9999 
 
 
 
Table 7 shows that conditional probabilities of having smoke given the 
occurrence or non-occurrence of fire. If there is actual fire (true), the probability of 
observing smoke is 0.9 and that of not observing is 0.1. On the other hand, if the fire did 
not take place, the probability of observing smoke is as low as 0.01 and that of not 
having smoke is 0.99. Since the two states of the node are mutually exclusive and 
independent, the probabilities for those states sum up to 1 according to the Probability 
Axiom 2, which dictates that the sum of the probabilities in a sample space must be 
equal to 1. Table 8 shows the NPT in a case where two parent nodes exist. For instance, 
the probability of activating the true alarm given false tampering and true fire is as high 
as 0.99. However, if someone tampers the alarm and, at the same time, actual fire occurs, 
the probability of having true alarm is the same as that of having false one. Provided that 
NPTs are established for each of the nodes, the prior probabilities of having true alarm is 
obtained by marginalization as presented in Eq. (5). 
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P(AL = T) = ∑ P(AL = T|TM, FR) 
= P(AL = T|TM = T, FR = T) ∗ P(TM = T) ∗ P(FR = T) 
+P(AL = T|TM = T, FR = F) ∗ P(TM = T) ∗ P(FR = F) 
+P(AL = T|TM = F, FR = T) ∗ P(TM = F) ∗ P(FR = T) 
+P(AL = T|TM = F, FR = F) ∗ P(TM = F) ∗ P(FR = F) 
= 0.02673 
Eq. (5) 
where AL is for alarm, TM for tampering, FR for fire, T for true and F for false.  
According to the Probability Axiom 2, the probability of false alarm, P(AL=F) becomes 
0.97327 (=1-0.02673). All the other prior probabilities can be calculated in this way and 
the results will be the same as shown in the Figure 9.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. The Posterior Probabilities of a Fire Scenario 
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As introduced, the strength of a BBN is its power to update prior probabilities 
using new observations. For instance, the prior probabilities of alarm are updated by 
entering observations about smoke. When smoke is observed (smoke=true), the 
probability of true fire given true smoke is calculated using the Bayes’ theorem as the 
following: 
 
P(FR = T|SM = T) =
𝑃(𝑆𝑀 = 𝑇|𝐹𝑅 = 𝑇) × 𝑃(𝐹𝑅 = 𝑇)
𝑃(𝑆𝑀 = 𝑇)
 
=
0.9 × 0.01
0.0189
= 0.47619 
Eq. (6) 
where SM stands for smoke. 
When this updated probability of true fire is used for P(FR=T) and P(FR=F) in the Eq. 
(5), the posterior probability of true alarm is increased to 0.47572 as presented in Figure 
10. 
More details about principles and applications of Bayes’ theorem and BBN can 
be found in a book written by Fenton and Neil [77]. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study consists of the following steps to achieve the objectives stated in the 
earlier section: (1) proposing an approach to measure safety culture by looking through 
artifacts, (2) developing a Dimension Matrix to formulate binary combination of safety 
culture dimensions, (3) devising Grading Schemes to provide a list of choices that 
describe different degree of safety values, (4) Generating a safety culture assessment 
questionnaire based on the Dimension Matrix and Grading Schemes, (5) constructing a 
Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) using the case scenario and a risk model based on 
Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) [72], (6) entering mock-up safety culture assessment data 
into Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) in the BBN model, (7) performing various analyses, 
e.g., diagnostic and predictive reasoning, using the BBN model, and finally (8) 
discussing analysis outcomes to examine how safety culture assessment results can be 
incorporated into the risk analysis of a process incident. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. A Diagram of Research Steps  
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3.1 Artifacts-based Safety Culture Assessment 
 
3.1.1 An Approach Looking through Artifacts 
As mentioned before, safety culture is generally viewed as a subset of 
organizational culture. Therefore, the three levels of culture, artifacts, espoused values 
and underlying assumptions, developed by Schein (1990) [24], are employed in this 
study. The hierarchy of these levels of culture is displayed with an analogy of an iceberg 
in Figure 12. Artifacts are visible expressions that are observed in an organization. 
Included in these artifacts are, for example, safety sign, campaign, meeting agenda, 
employee’s behavior, Job Safety Analysis (JSA), organizational hierarchy, and the 
physical condition of equipment and facility. Espoused values represent values, beliefs 
and goals embraced by the organization. These values are identified in, for instance, 
mission/vision statement, safety slogan and long-term goals that are announced openly. 
Hence, Espousals are the public face and reputation of the company [84]. Lastly, deeply 
rooted are basic and underlying assumptions. The underlying assumptions, located at the 
bottom of member’s mentality, are beliefs that they take for granted. They are not 
articulated in a written form but members of an organization accept it as a ground for 
reasoning, deciding and acting. 
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Figure 12. Three Levels of Culture and Three Approaches of Culture Measurement 
 
 
 
Because safety culture possesses such tacit property that does not express itself in 
easily identifiable ways, it is generally known to be difficult to directly measure safety 
culture. This statement is illustrated as view ① in Figure 12. Instead, some researchers 
insist that safety climate, a part above the surface, can be measured since it refers to 
more observable and perceivable phenomena (view ②), e.g., things on the work floor, 
and the employee’s perception of safety attitude of his/her supervisor. Studies about 
safety climate have become abundant since Zohar (1980) published a research paper [38] 
that surveys perceived level of different aspects of safety climate in several industries. 
Due to the fact that it measures the perceived status of affairs, his study mostly deals 
with safety climate. The present study, however, suggests a framework that gauges the 
state of safety culture based on replies to questions which requires, in general, a higher 
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level of comprehension of a company’s ‘how things are done around here’. Given the 
responses to the questionnaire is sincere, these would reveal more about the company’s 
values (view ③). In other words, this study views how the level of safety culture can be 
determined from expressions and performance of safety practices and activities. For 
instance, a question in Figure 13 delineates an example of the approach suggested in this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. An Example of a Two-dimensional Question 
 
 
 
Leadership of management is one of the most pivotal attributes that shape good 
or bad safety culture. This question asks the position of Chief Safety Officer (CSO) to 
find out how much values a company has for its safety leadership. An assumption made 
here is that the higher position the CSO takes, e.g., CEO, the stronger its safety culture 
would be. In this case, the position of the CSO is a type of manifestation of managerial 
organizational structure and the difference in the position indicates the strength of safety 
culture in leadership. 
Another finding from this question is that such question implies two different 
dimensions in its structure. In the question proposed in Figure 13, those dimensions are 
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leadership and organization, respectively. Even though it is possible to make a question 
that includes more than two dimensions, this study suggests only binary combinations of 
safety culture dimensions. How to make those pairs is explained in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 Safety Culture Dimension Matrix 
Disassembling a question into binary dimensions requires a Safety Culture 
Dimension Matrix as presented in Figure 14. Ten characteristics of excellent safety 
culture proposed by Mannan et al. (2013) [59] are employed in this matrix. Accordingly, 
the matrix generates 45 cells where two different dimensions or characteristics intersect. 
For instance, when a question contains the characteristics of Leadership (LS) and 
Organization & Structure (OS), such pair is represented as LS-OS. And this pair is not 
differentiated from the reversely-ordered pair, e.g., OS-LS. Therefore, the overall 
structure takes a right triangle. Abbreviations of those dimensions are included in the 
bracket after their names. 
The matrix represents the structure of safety culture in an organization in a visual 
manner. Such structure visualization can be implemented by placing scores obtained 
through safety culture survey in those cells. Assigning different colors, for example, red 
for a score below 4, amber for 4 to 6, yellow for 6 to 8 and green for 8 to 10 can provide 
more graphical effect. In addition, this matrix provides guidance that helps to address 
safety culture dimensions evenly, and not to focus on particular aspects. As revealed 
through literature review in section 2.1.3, huge differences exist among survey tools in 
terms of the type of dimensions and the number of question items. However, this matrix 
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provides all the combinations of two different dimensions with equal weights. A gray 
cell contains the sum of scores of both horizontal and vertical cells marked as blue 
arrows in the matrix. For instance, a total score of Organization & Structure (OS) is the 
sum of LS-OS, CV-OS, GP-OS, OS-EB, OS-RP, OS- SP, OS-MR, OS-LO and OS-VA. 
How scores are graded is discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Safety Culture Dimension Matrix 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Grading Scheme 
How to make grades for such pairs generated in Safety Culture Dimension 
Matrix is one of the key conditions to achieve the purpose of this research. The method 
suggested in this study is called an Artifacts-based Grading Scheme, which is a list of 
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different expressions of safety values that an organization possesses. For example, Table 
9 is developed to answer the question in Figure 13 (“At what position is your Chief 
Safety Officer?”). While 5-point Likert Scale common in safety culture/climate surveys 
asks how much one agrees or disagrees about a given statement, this Grading Scheme 
offers plausible choices that manifest different level of safety culture. For quantification 
of the answer, different points are given to each of the choices. If the CEO serves as 
Chief Safety Officer, then 10 out of 10 points are assigned, for example. The lower 
position he/she takes, the lower points are given. In this study, the full mark is ten and 
the number of choices is either five or three depending on the granularity of differing 
answers. 
 
 
 
Table 9. Management Level-based Grading Scheme 
Choices Point 
(a) CEO, Chief Executive Officer 10/10 
(b) COO, Chief Operating Officer 8/10 
(c) Vice President dedicated to safety 6/10 
(d) Vice President serving multiple duties 4/10 
(e) General manager or equivalent position 2/10 
 
 
 
Descriptions in the Grading Scheme may vary upon the size and type of 
organizations. Nevertheless, this approach is assumed to provide a means where more 
stable answers can be acquired. Totally, 17 Grading Schemes are developed in this 
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study. A list and details of those Artifacts-based Grading Schemes developed in this 
research are presented in Appendix A. 
There are several benefits that can be taken from the methodology suggested 
above. First of all, safety culture can be measured in a comprehensive breadth by 
addressing all the cells in the Safety Culture Dimension Matrix. Second, visual or 
graphical representation of safety culture structure can also be displayed using the 
matrix. This matrix represents the overall structure of safety culture of an organization. 
Assigning different scores or colors, for example, will make such structure more visible. 
Third, it is assumed that more stable and objective measurement can be obtained by 
suggesting specific descriptions about safety culture items, instead of just asking 
employee’s perception. Nonetheless, using artifacts are treacherous. Often times, they do 
not necessarily reveal the genuine state of affairs. Hence, being considerate and careful 
is necessary in designing a question and a Grading Scheme. 
 
3.1.4 Safety Culture Assessment Questionnaire 
One of the research objectives is to provide a set of questionnaires based on the 
aforementioned methodology. A questionnaire is composed of two dimensions, 
examples of questions and a Grading Scheme as presented in Figure 15. First of all, a 
pair of dimensions is selected from the Dimension Matrix. And then, a question that asks 
those two dimensions using one’s knowledge and expertise is devised. Finally, one of 
the Grading Schemes is selected to appropriately answer the question.  
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Figure 15. A Structure of Safety Culture Assessment Questionnaire 
 
 
 
In this study, a set of questionnaire is formulated based on my past experience 
and knowledge earned from literature [17, 36, 59]. The whole questionnaire based on 
this regime is provided in Appendix B.  
 
3.2 BBN Application 
As learned previously, Grading Schemes are devised as a way of translating 
qualitative states of affairs into numerical data that can be used in a risk analysis. Based 
on this, the BBN provides a platform on which different risk factors such as component 
failures and safety culture influences are connected each other. First of all, safety culture 
assessment results are transformed into ranks in Level 2 RIFs. And then, the relationship 
between Level 1 and 2 RIFs are determined by assigning different weights. The next step 
taking place between Level 2 RIFs and Safety Culture Influencing Factors (SCIFs) is 
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called Q-Q transition where qualitative rankings are changed into probability 
distributions. Details of each step are denoted in the following sections. 
 
3.2.1 Parameter Learning for RIFs 
The survey results of safety culture assessment become an input for a BBN 
analysis. In order for safety culture assessment results to be taken into the BBN, a 
special function called parameter learning is utilized and it is simply executed in 
AgenaRisk. A parameter learning enables to learn population parameters from sample 
data [77]. A couple of assumptions are made for this function. Firstly, it is assumed that 
the population follows a normal distribution truncated (T-Normal) from 0 to 10 since the 
full mark for a safety culture dimension is equal to 10. Secondly, the prior mean and the 
variance of the population are uniform with equal probability over [0, 10] since both of 
them are unknown. Because the likelihood distribution is T-Normal and the prior one is 
assumed to be uniform, the posterior distribution, based on the combination of those two 
distributions, becomes T-Normal. By the way, in order to reduce the complexity of a 
Bayesian Network, only some of the RIFs are selectively chosen as in Table 10.  
 
 
 
Table 10. RIFs Chosen for the Case Study 
Level(no.) RIFs 
Level I (6) 
Competence (personal), Procedure (task), HMI, Maintenance 
(technical), Work practice, Supervision (Organizational) 
Level 2 (6) 
Leadership, Organization & Structure, Employee engagement and 
behaviors, Resource allocation and performance management, 
Systems, standards and processes, Metrics and reporting 
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To simulate a company with higher safety culture, mock-up survey data for six 
periods, i.e., months or quarters, are formulated in Table 11. Using Leadership scores for 
6 periods from the table, parameters are learned and a ranked node of Leadership is 
earned as shown in Figure 16. This method is applied to the rest of mock-up survey data. 
 
 
 
Table 11. Mock-up Safety Culture Assessment Data 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Leadership 8.5 9 8.7 8.0 8.2 8.6 
Organization & structure 8.0 7.2 8.3 7.4 7.9 8.5 
Employee engagement & behaviors 5.9 6.6 6.9 7.2 6.7 5.8 
Resource allocation & performance 
management 
7.4 6.5 6.4 5.9 6.2 5.7 
Systems, standards & processes 7 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.2 8.0 
Metrics & reporting 6.0 6.6 6.9 6.2 5.8 6.3 
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Figure 16. A Parameter Learning Using Leadership Scores 
 
 
 
Table 12. Node Properties in a Parameter Learning 
Node 
Distribution 
type 
Mean Variance 
Lower 
boundary 
Upper 
boundary 
Periods T-Normal Mean_LS Var_LS 0 10 
Mean_LS Uniform N/A N/A 0 10 
Var_LS Uniform N/A N/A 0 10 
Leadership T-Normal Mean_LS/10 Var_LS/10 0 1 
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Node properties of parameter learning are provided in Table 12. In order to 
match the scale of input from the Periods to that of Leadership node, it takes the mean 
and the variance divided by 10. Learned parameters for those six Safety Culture RIFs 
and their statistics summary are presented in Table 13. The percentage of each rank is 
determined by discretizing the continuous distribution resulting from the mean and 
variance nodes into the intervals. In this study, 5-point scale is employed to show finer 
differences in safety culture dimensions. ‘Very low’ represents the interval between 0 
and 0.2 and ‘Low’ represents the interval between 0.2 and 0.4, etc.  
 
 
 
Table 13. Statistics Summary of Level 2 RIFs 
Level 2 RIFs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Ranks 
Very 
low 
Low Medium High 
Very 
high 
Leadership 0.73 0.21 2.79% 5.40% 12.21% 33.10% 46.50% 
Organization & 
Structure 
0.67 0.23 4.74% 8.92% 18.60% 34.39% 33.35% 
Employee 
Engagement & 
Behavior 
0.60 0.23 5.86% 13.16% 27.41% 33.44% 20.13% 
Resource Allocation 
& Performance Mgmt 
0.58 0.24 6.81% 14.66% 27.89% 31.48% 19.16% 
Systems, Standards & 
Processes 
0.67 0.22 3.96% 7.88% 18.28% 36.81% 33.08% 
Metrics & Reporting 0.61 0.20 3.26% 10.14% 32.17% 39.58% 14.85% 
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3.2.2 Connecting RIFs Using Weighted Mean 
The impact from the Level 2 RIFs to Level 1 RIFs is presented by weights placed 
on each of Level 2 RIFs. Determining the relationship – drawing an arc – between two 
levels of RIFs and assigning weights is recommended to be based on expert’s judgment. 
Weights are given using a scale of 0 to 5 but the sum of the weights is made equal to 10. 
When it is assumed to be no dependency between two RIFs, no arc is drawn and a dash 
is filled in the cell instead of zero. The weights of Level 2 RIFs for Level 1 RIFs are 
listed in Table 14. 
 
 
 
Table 14. The Weights of Level 2 RIFs for Level 1 RIFs 
Weight LS OS EB RP SP MR Sum 
Maintenance 2 - - 3 3 2 10 
Supervision 2 3 2 - - 3 10 
Procedure 3 1 - 1 5 - 10 
Competence 2 - 4 3 - 1 10 
Work Practice 2 2 3 - 3 - 10 
HMI - - 3 3 3 1 10 
Note)  LS=Leadership, OS=Organization & Structure, EB=Employee engagement & Behaviors, RP=Resource 
allocation & Performance management, SP=Systems, standards & Processes, MR=Metrics & Reporting. 
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3.2.3 Safety Culture Influencing Factors (SCIFs) 
Once the connection between Level 1 and Level 2 RIFs is completed, bridging 
qualitative rankings, e.g., very low to very high, of Level 2 RIFs to Safety Culture 
Influencing Factors (SCIFs) is imperative. SCIFs represent the effect of safety culture on 
the probabilities of events in the risk model. This transition is called qualitative-
quantitative (Q-Q) transition [85].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Q-Q Transition from Level 1 RIFs to SCIF 
 
 
 
In this transition, Level 1 RIFs are parent nodes and SCIFs are child nodes. To 
make such transition take place, the node probability table (NPT) is established to 
provide conditional probability distribution (CPD) for the child node and its respective 
parents. Table 15 shows the conditional ranking of a child node, SCIF, given the ranks 
of its parents. For instance, Maintenance and Supervision nodes are parents of 
Mechanical SCIF. If Maintenance is low but Supervision is high, then Mechanical SCIF 
has a medium (I) rank based on the matrix below. And then, a T-Normal distribution of 
different parameters is assigned to each rank. T-Normal distribution is characterized by 
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its mean and variance. When the variance is very large, a uniform distribution is 
formulated. On the other hand, when the mean is more or less than 0.5 and variance is 
close to 0, highly skewed distribution is obtained. Asking for expert’s opinion for these 
parameters is also necessary to get more realistic posterior distribution. Parameters used 
in this transition are shown in Table 16.  
 
 
 
Table 15. Conditional Ranking of a Child Node 
 
Very 
low 
Low Medium High Very high 
Very 
low 
Very Low 
(I) 
Very low 
(II) 
Low 
(I) 
Low 
(II) 
Medium 
(I) 
Low 
Very low 
(II) 
Low 
(I) 
Low 
(II) 
Medium 
(I) 
Medium 
(II) 
Medium 
Low 
(I) 
Low 
(II) 
Medium 
(I) 
Medium 
(II) 
High 
(I) 
High 
Low 
(II) 
Medium 
(I) 
Medium 
(II) 
High 
(I) 
High 
(II) 
Very 
high 
Medium 
(I) 
Medium 
(II) 
High 
(I) 
High 
(II) 
Very high 
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Table 16. Parameters of T-Normal for Each Rank 
  Mean Variance 
Lower 
Boundary 
Upper 
Boundary 
Very high 0.1 0.1 0 1 
High 
(II) 
0.15 0.1 0 1 
High 
(I) 
0.35 0.1 0 3 
Medium 
(II) 
0.7 0.3 0 3 
Medium 
(I) 
1 0.3 0 5 
Low 
(II) 
1.5 1 0 5 
Low 
(I) 
3 1 0 10 
Very low 
(II) 
7 2 0 10 
Very low 
(I) 
10 3 0 10 
 
 
 
Safety Culture Influencing Factors (SCIFs) would play as a change factor to 
generate a distribution of the predicted posterior probability based on the fixed prior 
probability and the ranks of its parents. In cases where two parents have both very low 
thus its child is assigned very low, the posterior probability is likely to increase by the 
factor of 10. Similarly, if the rank is determined very high, the posterior failure 
probability is likely to decrease by the factor of 0.1. However, when the conditional 
ranking turns out to be Medium (I), which is earned by two Medium parent nodes, the 
factor is equal to 1. That is, there is no significant change from the prior probability 
value. In order to keep the balance of such change effect, the product of opposite ranks, 
e.g., Very low (I) and Very high or Low (I) and High (I), is designed to be equal to 1.  
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4. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Case Scenario 
 
4.1.1 Universal Form Clamp Incident 
A case scenario for the application of BBN is established upon the CSB’s 
investigation of Universal Form Clamp (UFC) incident [86]. This incident happened on 
June 14, 2006 at UFC’s facility located in Bellwood, Illinois which manufactures several 
accessory products for concrete industry. While heating up a mixture of heptane and 
mineral spirits in a 2,200-gallon open-top tank equipped with steam coils, heated 
mixture was released from the tank and formed vapor cloud. The vapor cloud was 
ignited by an unknown ignition source several minutes later when a contractor deliver 
driver went into the facility while other workers working inside were evacuating. The 
contractor driver died several days later of severe burnt injury. The tank had a dual 
protection system to keep itself from being exposed to high temperature (High 
Temperature Protection System, HTPS): an automatic temperature control system 
(ATCS) and a manual temperature control system (MTCS). ATCS was composed of a 
temperature sensor and a pneumatic control unit to maneuver an automatic steam valve 
based on the measured temperature in the sensor. In addition to this, an operator was 
watching over the system by checking the temperature using an infrared thermometer 
and taking actions, e.g., shutting down the manual valve when necessary.  
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Also, according to the CSB investigation [86], there were several safety barriers 
that would have prevented such incident from happening. The mixing room was 
designed to minimize the ignition sources based on the relevant standard. The adjacent 
area, however, was not designed to do so. Hence, it was likely for vapor cloud to move 
into the vicinity and get ignited. Other barriers identified in the investigation were 
sprinkler system and emergency evacuation. Sprinkler system would also have been able 
to reduce the potential of vapor cloud’s ignition by wetting and cooling the flammable 
gas. Lastly, this case demonstrated that lack of emergency preparation for such a 
relatively huge release might lead to a fatality. If facility-wide emergency evacuation 
was effectively planned ahead and also regularly practiced, the life of the contractor 
driver could have been saved.  
 
4.1.2 A Bayesian Risk Model for the Case Scenario 
As the first step of building the Bayesian Risk Model, a fault tree and an event 
tree adapted from [87] are constructed as in Figure 18 and Figure 19, respectively. For 
the fault tree, two temperature control systems, ATCS and MTCS are considered as 
control barriers. The failure of ATCS is determined by three basic events: the failure of a 
sensor, a pneumatic control unit and an automatic valve. Likewise, the failure of MTCS 
is determined by other three basic events: the failure of an operator, an infrared 
thermometer and a manual valve. Three safety barriers are considered for the event tree 
in this case. They are ignition barrier, sprinkler system and emergency evacuation. Based 
on the success or failure of such safety or recovery barriers, four possible consequences 
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are assumed: gas contained, wet vapor cloud, VCE with low fatality, and VCE with high 
fatality. The generic probabilities of these events presented in Table 17 are obtained 
from literature [87] and some of them are adapted to meet the risk modeling 
requirement, i.e., that a probability must not exceed 0.1 as the maximum SCIF is as high 
as 10. In other words, when the prior probability is 0.15 and the SCIF is 10, for example, 
the posterior probability becomes 1.5, and this violates the Probability Axiom 2 that a 
probability of an event must not exceed 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. A Fault Tree of the High Temperature Protection System 
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Figure 19. An Event Tree of the Gas Release 
 
 
 
Table 17. Probability of Failure of Events 
Event Probability of Failure 
Sensor 0.040 
Pneumatic control unit 0.02015 
Automatic steam valve 0.0276 
Operator 0.100 
Infrared thermometer 0.0468 
Manual steam valve 0.0243 
Ignition barrier 0.082 
Sprinkler 0.040 
Emergency Evacuation 0.100 
 
 
 
In addition to the fault tree and the event tree, Level 1 RIFs and Level 2 RIFs are 
also incorporated into the risk model using AgenaRisk [77]. The overall structure of the 
risk model is presented in Figure 20. At the bottom of the Network, mock-up safety 
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culture survey data are used to determine the percentage of each rank of Level 2 RIFs. 
And then, each of Level 1 RIFs is influenced by four Level 2 RIFs. Connection between 
Level 1 RIFs and Level 2 RIFs is achieved by placing different weight on each of Level 
2 RIFs influencing a Level 1 RIF. The details of such weight placement are described in 
Section3.2.2. And then, two Level 1 RIFs are connected to one Safety Culture 
Influencing Factor (SCIF). Three SCIFs are introduced in this model: Mechanical, 
Personnel and Operational SCIFs. The naming and concept of these SCIFs are obtained 
from Pasman et al.’s work [88]. The SCIF plays as a change factor to represent the 
impact of safety culture that leads to basic events of the fault tree and safety barriers of 
the event tree. It also allows the transition from qualitative rankings to quantitative 
distributions, which is called Q-Q transition. Wang and Mosleh (2010) propose the 
QQBBN (Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian Belief Networks) and demonstrate such 
transition method in a simple case [85]. However, the present work exhibits its 
application to a more complicated network in which deeper organizational factors are 
addressed. The propagation from the basic events to the final consequences follows the 
logic gates – AND or OR– in the fault tree, and the pathways – Success or Failure – in 
the event tree. 
Again, the overall risk model presented Figure 20 enables to combine not only 
technical factors but also soft factors such as safety management and organizational 
elements. This model is expected to provide advantages that allow various analyses to be 
performed and the results of such analyses are provided in the following section. 
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Figure 20. The Bayesian Risk Model for the Case Scenario 
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4.2 BBN Results 
Using the methodology explained previously and the scenario built upon the 
incident case, a BBN model where both technical and organizational factors are 
combined is established. AgenaRisk [77] provides very useful functions to enable 
different analyses such as predictive and diagnostic reasoning. First of all, prior generic 
values of probability of failure are updated based on new evidences which are 
represented by SCIFs. As a result, posterior probability distributions are obtained for the 
events in the fault tree and the event tree. Based on this baseline case, several analyses 
are performed to figure out, e.g., which Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) make the most 
contribution to achieving a certain probability of an event (diagnostic reasoning), and to 
find out how worsened safety culture affects the probabilities of consequences. The BBN 
results of fault tree and event tree are provided as intermediate outcomes. 
 
4.2.1 Results for the Fault Tree 
With the inclusion of Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) and Safety Culture 
Influencing Factors (SCIFs), the posterior failure probabilities of the fault tree are 
estimated. The posterior probabilities are updated from prior generic data, single point 
estimate of failure rate, by including RIFs and SCIFs. The BBN results of two 
intermediate scenarios, the failure of Automatic Temperature Control System (ATCS) 
and that of Manual Temperature Control System (MTCS), are presented in Figure 23 
and Figure 24, respectively. As all the three basic events are associated with mechanical 
integrity, only Mechanical SCIF is connected to them. However, for the scenario of 
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MTCS failure, each of three SCIFs is used for each basic event. For example, Personnel 
SCIF is connected to Operator failure, Mechanical SCIF for Thermometer and 
Operational SCIF for Manual Steam Valve. The BBN result for the overall fault tree is 
shown in Figure 25. 
The BBN results reveal that the posterior distribution turns out to be right-
skewed thus has a long tail towards the right side which represents rarely expected high 
probabilities due to uncertainty involved in Low or Very low status of SCIFs. Simple 
examples of such skewed distributions are presented in Figure 21 and Figure 22. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Right-skewed Distribution 
 
Figure 22. Left-skewed Distribution 
 
 
 
The comparison between prior generic single point value and posterior 
probability data for the intermediate events and the top event are presented in Table 18. 
Values of the posterior probability distribution are obtained from Figure 25. Mean values 
are similar to or slightly larger than the generic values due to the tails of probability 
distributions but all the median values are found to be less than the generic data. This is 
explained by the existence of Very low and Low ranks of safety culture nodes. Even 
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though their percentages are quite small, they represent rare conditions where safety 
culture is severely weakened. 
 
 
 
Table 18. The Comparison between Generic and Posterior Probability in FT 
Event 
Generic 
Probability 
Posterior Probability Distribution 
Mean Median Std. Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
ACTS 0.085 0.093 0.071 0.090 0.039 0.119 
MCTS 0.163 0.159 0.132 0.130 0.076 0.200 
HTPS 0.014 0.020 0.008 0.046 0.003 0.019 
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Figure 23. The BBN Result of the Failure of ATCS 
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Figure 24. The BBN Result of the Failure of MTCS 
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Figure 25. The BBN Result of the Overall FT 
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Based on this overall baseline FT model, a predictive reasoning is carried out to 
figure out the difference from a medium level of safety culture. The BBN diagram is 
shown in Figure 26 and the comparison results are presented in Table 19. To reduce the 
complexity of the overall BBN model and to facilitate the comparison between different 
states, percentages of ranks earned from parameter learning in the Section 3.2.1 are 
manually entered in each of Level 2 RIFs. The case of higher level safety culture is 
shown in blue and that of medium level in green in the diagram. The higher level is 
represented by the mock-up safety culture survey data presented earlier in Table 11. The 
medium level of safety culture is instantiated by setting the rank as medium for all the 
Level 2 RIFs. The results show that the mean probability of ATCS and MTCS increases 
from 0.093 to 0.134 (44%) and 0.159 to 0.246 (55%), respectively when medium level 
of safety culture is considered. And also, the mean probability of the top event, HTPS, 
increases from 0.020 to 0.045 (125%) when medium level of safety culture is supposed. 
In addition, a diagnostic inference is performed to understand which safety 
culture dimensions need improvement to achieve a certain target probability. To 
compare with the baseline case, the target probability of 0.001 is assigned to the top 
event, gas release, of the fault tree. Typical risk criteria employed by petro-chemical 
industry suggest probability of such event between 1E-4 and 1E-5 as tolerable [89]. 
Nevertheless, considering that the probability of the top event calculated from prior 
generic failure data is as high as 0.0139, the target value of 0.001 is deemed as an 
attainable goal only with the improvement of safety culture, not relying on any 
additional technical barriers. The BBN graph for this comparison is presented in Figure 
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27. In that graph, blue bars represent the baseline case and orange ones indicate the 
target state. The comparison results are presented in Table 20 and they show that, in 
order to reach such target, significant improvement is required in Maintenance and 
Supervision for Level 1 RIF and Leadership and Systems, Standards & Processes for 
Level 2 RIF. To indicate the relative degree of change between the baseline case and the 
target state, the following calculation is performed:  
 Relative Change =
𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒
× 100(%)  
 
Eq. (7) 
The determination of the most influential factors in these comparisons is based on the 
sum of the absolute values of ‘Very low + Low’ and ‘High + Very high’. 
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Figure 26. A Predictive Reasoning for FT Given Medium Safety Culture 
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Figure 27. A Diagnostic Reasoning for FT Given Target Probability 
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Table 19. The Differences between Higher and Medium Level of Safety Culture 
Event 
Higher Level (Baseline) Medium Level 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
ATCS 0.093 0.071 0.090 0.134 0.100 0.120 
MTCS 0.159 0.132 0.130 0.246 0.207 0.169 
HTPS 0.020 0.008 0.046 0.045 0.023 0.064 
 
 
 
Table 20. The Differences between the Baseline Case and the Target State 
RIFs 
Very low + Low Medium High + Very high 
Baseline Target Baseline Target Baseline Target 
Relative Change Relative Change Relative Change 
L
ev
el
 1
 
Maintenance 
17.0% 6.1% 28.2% 21.6% 54.8% 72.3% 
-63.7% -23.5% 31.8% 
Supervision 
16.6% 6.4% 28.1% 20.4% 55.2% 73.2% 
-61.6% -27.7% 32.7% 
Procedure 
14.6% 6.7% 25.5% 20.2% 59.9% 73.1% 
-53.8% -20.9% 22.0% 
Competence 
21.0% 11.1% 29.4% 25.6% 49.5% 63.4% 
-47.4% -13.1% 27.9% 
Work Practices 
15.5% 9.9% 27.3% 24.5% 57.2% 65.6% 
-36.5% -10.3% 14.8% 
HMI 
20.0% 13.2% 29.2% 27.1% 50.8% 59.8% 
-33.9% -7.4% 17.6% 
L
ev
el
 2
 
Leadership 
8.2% 5.0% 12.2% 9.9% 79.6% 85.1% 
-38.5% -18.9% 6.9% 
Organization & 
Structure 
13.7% 10.8% 18.6% 17.1% 67.7% 72.2% 
-21.3% -8.1% 6.5% 
Employee 
Engagement & 
Behavior 
19.0% 13.9% 27.4% 25.4% 53.6% 60.7% 
-26.8% -7.5% 13.3% 
Resource Allocation 
& Performance Mgmt 
21.5% 16.0% 27.9% 26.1% 50.6% 57.9% 
-25.5% -6.5% 14.4% 
Systems, Standards & 
Processes 
11.8% 7.2% 18.3% 15.3% 69.9% 77.4% 
-38.9% -16.1% 10.8% 
Metrics & Reporting 
13.4% 9.8% 32.2% 29.5% 54.4% 60.6% 
-26.7% -8.2% 11.4% 
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4.2.2 Results for the Event Tree 
As learned throughout this work, safety culture influences not only basic events 
of a fault tree but also it affects the safety barriers or recovery barriers of an event tree. 
This section illustrates how the consequences of an initiating event are impacted by 
safety culture via SCIFs. The top event of the fault tree, gas release due to HTPS failure, 
is used as an initiating event of the event tree. Similar to what is done in the fault tree, 
SCIFs are connected to the safety barriers, for instance, Mechanical SCIF for Ignition 
Barrier and Sprinkler nodes and Personnel SCIF for Emergency Evacuation node. The 
BBN result for the overall ET is presented in Figure 28. The predicted posterior 
probabilities of final consequences are compared with the calculation outcomes using 
generic probability data, which is presented in Table 21. Similar to the results of FT, 
mean values of posterior probabilities are larger than the calculated values of generic 
data due to a long tail.  
 
 
 
Table 21. The Comparison between Generic and Posterior Probability in ET 
Consequence 
Calculation 
from Generic 
Probability 
Posterior Probability Distribution 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Safe Operation 0.986 0.981 0.992 0.002 0.981 0.997 
Gas Contained 1.28E-2 1.48E-2 7.75E-3 2.27E-2 3.04E-3 1.74E-2 
Wet Vapor 1.09E-3 3.45E-3 3.46E-4 1.58E-2 7.70E-5 1.52E-3 
VCE, Low 
Fatality 
4.10E-5 7.93E-4 7.38E-6 7.05E-3 8.67E-7 6.35E-5 
VCE, High 
Fatality 
4.56E-6 2.91E-4 4.65E-7 8.98E-3 3.94E-8 5.31E-6 
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Figure 28. The BBN Result of the Overall ET
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4.2.3 Results for the Overall Risk Model 
By assembling the FT and the ET, the BBN of the overall risk model is 
developed and presented in Figure 31. The overall structure of the BBN is quite similar 
to that of the HCL-based risk model drawn in Figure 6. Based on these baseline results, a 
diagnostic analysis is performed by assigning a specific target probability to one of the 
consequences, e.g., 0.99999 for Safe Operation (or 1E-5 for any unsafe occasions). The 
diagram for this analysis is presented in Figure 32. The analysis results are shown in 
Table 22 and the differences of only Level 2 RIFs are provided to figure out which 
elements of safety culture need improvement. Using Eq. (7), a comparison between 
baseline case and Safe Operation state is made similarly as what has been done in Table 
20. Based on the results, Leadership and Systems, Standards & Processes require such 
improvement effort to the most extent. 
 
 
 
Table 22. The Differences between States for Safe Operation 
Level 2 RIFs 
Very low + Low Medium High + Very high 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Relative Change Relative Change Relative Change 
Leadership 
8.2% 5.9% 12.2% 10.6% 79.6% 83.5% 
-28.5% -12.8% 4.9% 
Organization & 
Structure 
13.7% 11.6% 18.6% 17.6% 67.7% 70.8% 
-15.1% -5.5% 4.6% 
Employee Engagement 
& Behavior 
19.0% 15.7% 27.4% 26.3% 53.6% 58.0% 
-17.3% -4.1% 8.3% 
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Table 22 Continued 
Level 2 RIFs 
Very low + Low Medium High + Very high 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Baseline 
Safe 
Operation 
Relative Change Relative Change Relative Change 
Resource Allocation & 
Performance Mgmt 
21.5% 17.8% 27.9% 26.9% 50.6% 55.3% 
-17.1% -3.7% 9.3% 
Systems, Standards & 
Processes 
11.8% 8.7% 18.3% 16.5% 69.9% 74.9% 
-26.9% -9.8% 7.1% 
Metrics & Reporting 
13.4% 10.8% 32.2% 30.4% 54.4% 58.8% 
-19.5% -5.4% 8.0% 
 
 
 
Figure 33 depicts how the baseline case changes if some dimensions of safety 
culture get worse. To simulate an economic downturn in which safety leadership and 
resources for safety may compromise, both Leadership and Resource Allocation & 
Performance Management are instantiated to be Very low as presented in Figure 29 and 
Figure 30 while other dimensions remain unchanged. Because of the weakened safety 
culture, the probabilities of consequences are changed and the results are presented in 
Table 23. Particularly, the probabilities of vapor cloud explosion (VCE) with low and 
high fatality are increased by the factor of 4 and 5, respectively. 
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Table 23. The Differences between States Due to Worsened Safety Culture 
Consequence 
Baseline Case Worsened Safety Culture 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Safety Operation 0.981 0.002 0.937 0.009 
Gas Contained 1.48E-2 2.27E-2 4.33E-2 4.14E-2 
Wet Vapor 3.45E-3 1.58E-2 1.72E-2 3.93E-2 
VCE, Low Fatality 7.93E-4 7.05E-3 4.06E-3 1.40E-2 
VCE, High Fatality 2.91E-4 8.98E-3 1.91E-3 1.02E-2 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. Worsened Leadership 
 
Figure 30. Worsened Resource Allocation 
& Performance Mgmt 
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Figure 31. The Baseline BBN Result of the Overall Risk Model 
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Figure 32. A Diagnostic Reasoning for Safe Operation 
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Figure 33. A Predictive Reasoning for Worsened Leadership & Resource Allocation 
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
Safety culture is increasingly accepted as one of the most essential elements to 
manage risks in large and complex engineering systems. Because of relatively high 
magnitude of consequences in process facilities, they emphasize the importance of 
fostering an excellent safety culture within the organization. Based on the literature 
review findings, this study suggests three important rationales for the need of safety 
culture research effort: safety culture as a root cause, a risk factor and a legal 
requirement. 
In order to take advantage of safety culture as a useful tool to manage risks, the 
effective assessment of safety culture is imperative. Hence, this study proposes a 
methodology of measuring safety culture using an approach designed to capture the 
differences in visible phenomena or activities that are assumed to reveal the level of 
safety culture. To facilitate this approach, Safety Culture Dimension Matrix based on 
Mannan et al. (2013)’s work [59] and a set of Grading Schemes are developed. As a 
result, a safety culture assessment questionnaire is also generated as Appendix B. 
Moreover, in this study, a Bayesian Belief Network is developed. In the BBN, 
generic technical failure rate data and mock-up safety culture survey data are combined 
for a risk analysis. Based on the UFC incident case [86], a risk model is constructed 
using Hybrid Causal Logic (HCL) [72]. A fault tree and an event tree as parts of the risk 
model are established based on the case scenario of the incident. For the inclusion of 
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safety culture in the risk model, two levels of Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) and Safety 
Culture Influencing Factors (SCIFs) are employed. SCIFs make the transition from 
qualitative knowledge to quantitative data possible.  
The BBN model established in this study illustrates how generic probability of 
failure of an event is updated with evidences of safety culture assessment results. In 
overall, the mean values of posterior probability distribution are found to be moderately 
larger than the generic probability value due to its asymmetrical tails or simply skewness. 
But it is worth noting that uncertainty associated with organizational factors, e.g., the 
influence of safety culture, is modeled and represented in this work.  
Finally, this socio-technical risk analysis model is assumed to be useful in 
translating safety culture survey data into a quantitative risk analysis. Several studies 
have been performed to consider organizational factors into QRA but the use of safety 
culture assessment results is rarely addressed in such works. In this regard, it is notable 
that the present work particularly focuses on the measurement of safety culture and its 
application to a risk analysis. As a result, the model presents the overall risk structure 
that embraces multiple layers of technical systems and underlying influencing factors 
that include safety culture. Based on this socio-technical risk structure, the effect of 
underlying factors on the failure of technical components is investigated. Such analysis 
is expected to provide useful information for decision making processes to improve 
safety culture of an organization and thus to manage operational risks in process 
industries.  
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5.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
First of all, it is recommended to apply the proposed safety culture assessment 
questionnaire to those working in industries who are familiar with and knowledgeable of 
process safety culture. Since safety artifacts, i.e., procedures and organizational structure 
may vary from one organization to another, it is also acceptable to tailor the 
questionnaire to fit to the particular context of the organization. Once the actual survey 
data is acquired, more realistic risk representation will become available.  
For the BBN modeling in this study, safety culture is considered as a leading 
indicator that affects the causation of an incident, not affected by such incident. However, 
those incidents, either being catastrophic or being repeated in a short period of time, are 
likely to make the existing safety culture unstable. Therefore, it is recommended to 
model a dynamic BBN model where the occurrence of an incident, e.g., loss of 
containment, may cause a change in the status of safety culture and, in turn, weakened 
safety culture influences risks of other incidences.  
This study is largely focused on the integration of technical factors and 
organization factors represented by safety culture. However, real-world cases often entail 
the consideration of all the risk factors aforementioned: technical, human, organizational 
and societal factors. Therefore, it is highly recommended to perform further studies to 
investigate the relationship among these factors and to incorporate all of them in a 
quantitative risk analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
A.1 A List of Artifacts-based Grading Schemes 
Artifacts-based Grading Schemes 
1 Management Level-based 
2 Top-down-based 
3 Bottom-up-based 
4 Organization Span-based 
5 Budgeting-based 
6 Incentive-based 
7 Frequency-based 
8 Proactive/Reactive-based 
9 Timeliness-based 
10 Compliance-based 
11 Standards-based 
12 Information Source-based 
13 Expertise-based 
14 Safety Status-based 
15 Behavior-based 
16 Incident type-based 
17 Fraction-based 
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A.2 Details of Artifacts-based Grading Schemes 
1. Management Level-basedGrading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) CEO, Chief Executive Officer 10/10 
(b) COO, Chief Operating Officer 8/10 
(c)  Vice President dedicated to safety 6/10 
(d) Vice President serving multiple duties  4/10 
(e)  General manager or equivalent position 2/10 
 
2. Top-down-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) To management to general employees 10/10 
(b) Top management to supervisors 8/10 
(c)  Top management to managers 6/10 
(d) Top management to directors 4/10 
(e)  Only top management 2/10 
 
3. Bottom-up-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) General employees to top management 10/10 
(b) General employees to directors 8/10 
(c)  General employees to managers 6/10 
(d) General employees to supervisors 4/10 
(e)  Only for general employees 2/10 
 
4. Organizational Span-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) In all functions including all the corporate staff 10/10 
(b) In engineering (design) and operation (production) functions 8/10 
(c)  In operation (production) functions 6/10 
(d) In the division to which the group belongs 4/10 
(e)  In the group where the safety information is made 2/10 
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5. Budgeting-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Unconditionally provided 10/10 
(b) Evenly provided as other priorities 8/10 
(c)  Often influenced by other objectives 6/10 
(d) Only enough to meet legal requirements 4/10 
(e)  Less than necessary to comply with regulation 2/10 
 
6. Incentive-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) An appropriate amount of incentive in various forms  10/10 
(b) An appropriate amount of incentive only in cash or similar compensation 6/10 
(c)  Limited amount of safety incentive in cash award 2/10 
 
7. Frequency-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Always (100% of times) 10/10 
(b) Frequently (80% of times) 8/10 
(c)  Often (60% of times) 6/10 
(d) Sometimes (40% of times) 4/10 
(e)  Rarely (20% or less) 2/10 
 
8. Proactive/reactive-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Always do proactively (before incidents) 10/10 
(b) Generally do proactively 8/10 
(c)  Both proactively and reactively 6/10 
(d) Generally reactively 4/10 
(e)  Always reactively (after incidents) 2/10 
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9. Timeliness-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Very timely 10/10 
(b) Mostly within a time specified in a procedure 8/10 
(c)  Often delayed after the specified time in (b) 6/10 
(d) Seems timely but there is no relevant procedure that requires timeliness 4/10 
(e)  Not timely and there is no relevant procedure that requires timeliness 2/10 
 
10. Compliance-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) 
Procedure is strictly followed  and even followed beyond what is required 
by procedure 
10/10 
(b) Procedure is followed most of time 8/10 
(c)  Procedure is often ignored 6/10 
(d) Procedure is seldom followed 4/10 
(e)  There is no such procedure 2/10 
 
11. Standards-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Standards are high enough to be said as RAGAGEP* 10/10 
(b) Standards are high enough to meet regulatory requirement 8/10 
(c)  Standards barely satisfy regulatory requirement 6/10 
(d) Standards often fail to meet regulatory requirement 4/10 
(e)  Standards seldom meet regulatory requirement 2/10 
* Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices 
 
 
12. Information Source-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Using both internal and external safety information actively 10/10 
(b) Mostly internal information but using major external sources 8/10 
(c)  Using various internal safety information 6/10 
(d) Relying on only major internal safety information 4/10 
(e)  Rarely using safety information 2/10 
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13. Expertise-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) 
In addition to internal personnel, use third part experts based on their 
performance capabilities  
10/10 
(b) 
In addition to internal personnel, use third party experts based on bidding 
prices  
8/10 
(c)  Use internal expert group(s) 6/10 
(d) Use internal expert individual(s) 4/10 
(e)  Use internal personnel of limited expertise 2/10 
 
14. Safety Status-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) Safety is always higher than any other disciplines 10/10 
(b) Safety has the equal status as other business objectives 8/10 
(c)  Safety often comes after other business objectives (production, profit) 6/10 
(d) Safety gets focused only when incidents happen 4/10 
(e)  Safety has never had the equal status as other goals 2/10 
 
15. Behavior-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) 
Act beyond what is required by safety standards even when nobody is 
watching 
10/10 
(b) Often act above what is required by safety procedures 8/10 
(c)  Mostly comply with safety standards 6/10 
(d) Often fail to comply with safety standards 4/10 
(e)  Such behaviors are seldom seen 2/10 
 
16. Incident type-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) From catastrophe to near-miss 10/10 
(b) From catastrophe to minor incidents 8/10 
(c)  From catastrophe to major incidents  6/10 
(d) Only catastrophe 4/10 
(e)  A fraction of catastrophic incidents 2/10 
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17. Fraction-based Grading Scheme 
 Choices Point 
(a) All of them (100%) 10/10 
(b) Much of them (80%) 8/10 
(c)  More than a half (60%) 6/10 
(d) Less than a half (40%) 4/10 
(e)  Little of them (20%) 2/10 
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APPENDIX B 
B.1 Safety Culture Assessment Questionnaire 
Gray empty cells represent the combinations that are already addressed in previous part of the table, e.g., Leadership-
Organization & Structure (LS-OS) makes OS-LS pair gray and empty.  
Dimension 1 Dimension2 Example(s) of Questions 
Grading 
Scheme 
Leadership 
Culture & Values 
How often does the agenda of high level meetings include no safety issues 
when it would be necessary? 
Frequency-
based 
How visibly does management demonstrate the value of safety through his/her 
action? 
Behavior-
based 
How proactively (or reactively) does management address process safety 
concerns? 
Proactive/Rea
ctive-based 
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
How far down does management relay messages of safety goals, policies and 
objectives to employees?  
Top-down-
based 
How much support and commitment does management offer to implement 
safety goals, policies and initiatives? 
Budgeting-
based 
Organization & 
structure 
What is the position of the Chief Safety Officer? 
Management 
Level-based 
Which management level participates in a joint safety and health committee? 
Management 
Level-based 
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
How often does management empower expertise (or expert group) when 
making critical safety decisions versus how often not? 
Frequency-
based 
How much support does management provide to employees to reinforce an 
individual's safety authority and responsibility? 
Budgeting-
based 
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How well are responsibilities and accountabilities established and observed for 
every level of organization? 
Compliance-
based 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
In case it is deemed necessary, how often does management support the health 
and safety efforts not only in words but also in actions? 
Frequency-
based 
How much and what kind of incentive does management provide to enhance 
process safety? 
Incentive-
based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Does your company have a written procedure that requires managers to serve in 
safety roles and receive intensive process safety training? 
Compliance-
based 
Is compliance with safety standards an unnegotiable condition of employment? 
Compliance-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
How far up in the management structure are safety performances or statistics 
reported? 
Management 
Level-based 
How often does management respond to employee concerns or reporting versus 
how often they neglect to respond? 
Frequency-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
Does your manager attend and actively participate in safety training sessions 
and safety drills? 
Behavior-
based 
Does your manager participate directly in the investigation when an incident 
occurs? 
Behavior-
based 
In what timely manner do managers and supervisors communicate safety 
information with members in the group that he/she leads? 
Timeliness-
based 
Verification & 
audit 
How do managers monitor junior members' commitment to safety?  
Compliance-
based 
How frequently does management reinforce the fundamental importance of 
safety to the organization? 
Frequency-
based 
How wide sources of safety information does management utilize to ensure that 
safety messages are communicated? 
Information 
Source-based 
Is there a formal and effective management review system for safety 
performance and safety culture development? 
Compliance-
based 
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Culture & 
Values 
Leadership     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
How much attention do safety accomplishments have when compared with 
other business successes? 
Safety Status-
based 
Organization & 
structure 
What status and compensation do safety professionals in your organization have 
when compared with other key members? 
Safety Status-
based 
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
How often do you see that standing up for safety is perceived as a positive and 
strong action when there is good reason for it?  
Frequency-
based 
How often are employees treated with respect following an incident versus how 
often not? 
Frequency-
based 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
How does your company make decisions to allocate budget on safety when 
compared with other business objectives? 
Safety Status-
based 
How often does your organization compromise safety to meet short-term cost or 
production targets? 
Frequency-
based 
How much of resources does your company allocate on preventing incidents 
and eliminating hazards rather than responding to incidents? 
Proactive/Rea
ctive-based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
How do people in your organization behave in compliance with safety 
standards?  
Compliance-
based 
Are your company's safety standards high enough to ensure the safety of tasks 
to be performed? 
Standards-
based 
Is there a written program that lists the individual's responsibility about process 
safety goals and policies? 
Compliance-
based 
Does your company have a zero tolerance policy about deviation from safety 
standards? 
Compliance-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
What is the primary motivation of reporting incidents: compliance, 
reward/punishment or voluntary concerns for other's safety? 
Proactive/Rea
ctive-based 
How does your organization monitor and respond to leading and lagging 
indicators? 
Incident type-
based 
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A continually 
learning 
organization 
How are safety culture, vision, expectations, roles, responsibilities and 
standards discussed and trained?  
Bottom-up-
based 
Does your company have formal plans that require employees to enhance their 
safety-related knowledge and expertise? 
Compliance-
based 
Verification & 
audit 
Does your company maintain its vigilance through real-time drills, rigorous 
safety audits and inspections? 
Standards-
based 
How does your company perform periodic and special safety studies? 
Expertise-
based 
Do investigations of process safety failures identify root causes or underlying 
causes? 
Frequency-
based 
Goals, policies 
& initiatives 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Organization & 
structure 
How frequently do you receive safety information from the company? 
Frequency-
based 
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
How often are employees involved in setting goals, policies and initiatives 
regarding process safety?  
Frequency-
based 
Does your company have a written procedure that allows employees to 
participate in a planning or design process of safety initiatives? 
Compliance-
based 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
How does your organization support new safety programs and initiatives for 
their implementation by making capital investment? 
Budgeting-
based 
Are the consequences of willful violations of safety policies, procedures, and 
rules established and actively enforced? 
Compliance-
based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Does your company have a formal system in which employees establish and 
review process safety goals? 
Compliance-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
Does your company have a policy that imposes discipline for those who fail or 
intentionally omit to report? 
Compliance-
based 
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A continually 
learning 
organization 
How much are lessons learned from incidents considered in reviewing and 
resetting safety goals, policies and safety initiatives? 
Fraction-based 
Verification & 
audit 
Does your company monitor the effectiveness of new policies and initiatives 
until they have full taken root and become self-sustaining? 
Compliance-
based 
How frequently are safety policies and initiatives replaced or re-engineered 
before they are deeply embedded in the organization? 
Frequency-
based 
Organization & 
structure 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
Does your company have a joint safety committee comprised of management 
and worker representatives? 
Compliance-
based 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
How widely do safety departments provide safety expertise, develop safety 
goals and policies and manage safety communications throughout the 
company? 
Organization 
Span-based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Does your company provide opportunities for job rotation to decrease errors 
due to monotony? 
Compliance-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
Do you have dual lines of reporting, one up through the operating site leader 
and the other through the dedicated safety personnel? 
Compliance-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
How broadly are lessons learned from investigations of incidents and near 
misses, audits, and hazard assessments? 
Organization 
Span-based 
Verification & 
audit 
Are safety audit protocols consistently applied at different parts in the 
organization? 
Compliance-
based 
Employee 
engagement & 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
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behaviors Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Organization & 
structure 
    
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
Do managers and safety professionals have opportunities to speak up for safety 
when a proposed budget seems to threaten safety? How often versus how often 
not? 
Frequency-
based 
Does your company have a formal budgeting process to give enough resources 
to support process safety initiatives? 
Compliance-
based 
Does your company manage workforce issues so that staffing levels and fatigue 
are appropriately controlled?  
Compliance-
based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Does your company have a peer review program that helps employees take 
some responsibility for safety performance of their co-workers?  
Compliance-
based 
Does your company reinforce that all employees have responsibilities to 
themselves, their co-workers, the company, and the community? 
Organization 
Span-based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
How open and responsive are lines of communication between peer workers, 
and up and down the organizational hierarchy? 
Timeliness-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
How often are workers asked to participate in incident investigations versus 
how often not? 
Frequency-
based 
Do you learn from peers at internal sources as well as external training 
opportunities?  
Information 
Source-based 
Verification & 
audit 
How are employees' safe/unsafe behaviors reviewed by managers? 
Compliance-
based 
How well and fairly is your safety performance recognized and evaluated by 
peers and managers? 
Safety Status-
based 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
 110 
 
Organization & 
structure 
    
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
    
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Are safety expenditures made systematically and based on effective risk 
assessment and cost-benefit analysis? 
Compliance-
based 
How timely is management response to unacceptable performance of process 
safety requirements? 
Timeliness-
based 
How many of Job Safety Analyses (JSA) are completed, of what quality? Fraction-based 
Do managers and employees of your company follow operational procedures 
without shortcuts or unapproved deviations? 
Compliance-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
Does your company recommend to report incidents by giving proper 
incentives?  
Incentive-
based 
Does your organization maintain standards of performance through timely 
reporting of performance statistics? 
Timeliness-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
How well do your company utilize learnings from previous accidents, near 
misses and non-compliant behaviors? 
Frequency-
based 
Verification & 
audit 
Does your company tolerate an employee's repeated unsafe acts and failure to 
comply with safety procedures and requirements?  
Compliance-
based 
Does your company perform formal root cause analysis to identify root causes 
and thus prevent recurrence of incidents in the future? 
Compliance-
based 
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Organization & 
structure 
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Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
    
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
    
Metrics & 
reporting 
Is a formal system established to ensure employees to report potential hazards? 
Compliance-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
How much are learnings from incidents and hazard assessment used for design 
of the facility and procedures? 
Fraction-based 
Verification & 
audit 
Does a formal communication system exist for sharing information on process 
safety standards? 
Compliance-
based 
Is this communication system monitored to ensure that the information is 
reaching all facility personnel? 
Top-down-
based 
Are there formal tracking systems that ensure process safety recommendations 
and suggestions are imposed for their timely resolution? 
Compliance-
based 
Does your company have a tiered audit process that utilizes both internal 
personnel and third parties? 
Expertise-
based 
When there is a change to a process, facility or organization, how timely are 
operating procedures updated accordingly? 
Timeliness-
based 
Metrics & 
reporting 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Organization & 
structure 
    
Employee 
engagement & 
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behaviors 
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
    
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
    
A continually 
learning 
organization 
How much of the lessons are captured into design, procedures, training, 
maintenance and other safety programs?  
Fraction-based 
How does your company define incidents that need further investigation? 
Catastrophic consequence and/or near misses? 
Incident type-
based 
How widely are investigation results and lessons shared across the 
organization? 
Organization 
Span-based 
Verification & 
audit 
Does your company verify the adequacy and effectiveness of safety audits by 
using metrics such as the number of audits schedules vs. conducted? 
Compliance-
based 
A continually 
learning 
organization 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Organization & 
structure 
    
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
    
Resource 
Allocation 
&performance 
management 
    
Systems,     
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standards & 
processes 
Metrics & 
reporting 
    
Verification & 
audit 
How does your organization use audit results as an important process safety 
information? 
Information 
Source-based 
Does your company have a written procedure to ensure process hazard analysis 
and incident investigation are appropriately performed? 
Compliance-
based 
Verification & 
audit 
Leadership     
Culture & Values     
Goals, policies & 
initiatives 
    
Organization & 
structure 
    
Employee 
engagement & 
behaviors 
    
Resource 
Allocation & 
performance 
management 
    
Systems, 
standards & 
processes 
    
Metrics & 
reporting 
    
A continually 
learning 
organization 
    
 
